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Abstract 
Vulnerability analysis is a key issue in power systems since power 
transmission grids play a crucial role as a critical infrastructure. The power 
grid structure (number of nodes and lines, their connections, and their 
physical properties and operational constraints) is one of the main factors 
to assure power system security. Complex network theory as a promising 
topological approach for the structural vulnerability analysis has been 
widely used in many different fields. Recently, many complex network 
metrics have been proposed to assess the topological vulnerability of 
power transmission grids. However, these approaches are purely 
topological and fail in capturing the specific features of power systems. In 
this paper, an extended topological approach which incorporates electrical 
features such as flow path, line flow limits, etc., is presented. Three new 
metrics, net-ability, electrical betweenness and entropy degree are 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
provided and used to assess structural vulnerability in power transmission 
grids. 
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Power transmission grids; structural vulnerability analysis; topological 
approach; net-ability; electrical betweenness; entropy degree. 
 
 
Text 
 
1. Introduction 
Complex networks (CN) science has received considerable attention 
recently which has been used in many different fields such as: biology, 
chemistry, social sciences, computer networks, etc (S. Boccaletti et al., 
2006). A lot of researches including basic characteristics, statistical global 
graph properties, small-world property, scale-free property, degree 
distribution, betweenness distribution and vulnerability analysis, have 
been performed to power grids since they are infrastructures in our 
society. It is noticed that there is a strong link between the topological 
structure and operation performance in power systems because the 
structural change could alter operational condition of a power system and 
thus change its operation performance. As a result, there is an increasing 
interest in analysing structural vulnerability of power grids by means of 
CN methodology.  
However, most part of these researches are purely topological because 
they are based on the graphical representation of a network as nodes and 
connection patterns which neglects the specific engineering features of 
power grids. Firstly, from the perspective of electrical engineering, the 
metric of distance in CN theory should have a more practical meaning. For 
power systems, this conception can be described from economic or 
technological point of view such as transmission loss or line impedance, 
etc. Secondly, in traditional CN methodology, all elements are treated 
identically. Actually, in power transmission, there are different kinds of 
nodes like generation buses, transmission buses and load buses. Thirdly, in 
pure topological approach, edges are described in an un-weighted way. 
While in power systems, transmission lines definitely have line flow limits 
which restrict the ability of the line for power. This feature is critical for 
the networks to perform their essential functions and cannot be neglected 
in vulnerability assessment. Finally, in previous researches, the physical 
quantity between two vertices is supposed to be transmitted through the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
shortest path. For power system, power transmission from a generator bus 
to a load bus will involve most lines (E. Bompard et al., 2009; 2010). 
From the discussion above we can see that combining some electrical 
engineering features with CN theory will be more appropriate to analyse 
the structural vulnerability of power grids. Based on this consideration, in 
this paper, three extended metrics of entropy degree, electrical 
betweenness and net-ability are proposed to replace the traditional metrics 
of degree, betweenness and efficiency to access the vulnerability of power 
grids. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we review and 
compare the scientific studies conducted using CN analysis techniques 
concerning power systems. In section 3, the extended topological 
measures are introduced.  Open issues and conclusions are discussed in 
section 4. 
 
2. Overview of the CN application in power systems 
 
2.1 General approach review 
 
Complex networks methodology can be conceptualized as the intersection 
between the graph theory and statistical mechanics (L. D. Costa, et al., 
2007). Specifically, a complex system is firstly abstracted as a network 
with a set of edges (or lines) connecting a set of vertices (or nodes). Then, 
structural properties of the abstracted network and its evolution process 
can be studied by a set of informative indices based only on the geometric 
features of the system that do not change over time.  
When applying to power systems, the electrical power grid as a weighted 
and directed network identified by a set Y = {B, L, W} where B (dim {B} 
= NB) is the set of vertices (or nodes), L (dim {L} = NL) is the set of edges 
(or links) and W is set of line weights.  Vertices are identified by index i. 
Edges are identified by lij, which represents a connection between vertex i 
and vertex j. And the weight element wij in the set W is associated with 
each line lij. 
After abstracting the power grid as a graph, an interesting first way to 
categorize it is analyzed. An important metric that characterizes a vertex 
of a graph is the degree which means the number of vertexes the node 
connects with. Moreover, it is not essential to just have the specific 
information regarding the node degree of only a certain node. The overall 
characteristics of a graph considering its statistical measure like node 
degree probability distribution. The degree and the node degree 
distribution will give some information about the static feature of the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
network.  However, there isn’t any information about the paths that can be 
followed in the graph to move from one node to another. The number of 
edges in a path connecting vertices i and j is called the length of the path, 
while the shortest path between these two vertices is one of the paths 
connecting them with minimum path length. To describe the importance 
of a node with respect to the shortest paths in the graph, betweenness is 
proposed which is defined as the number of shortest paths between any 
other nodes that traverses it. Except as the local measurement, it is also 
useful to have a high level glimpse of the betweenness property for a 
whole network which can be restored to a statistic measure: betweenness 
distribution.  
A general approach about how to apply CN theory to power systems has 
been overviewed. The more specific methodology review will be 
addressed in following section. 
 
2.2 Overview of the CN applied to power systems 
 
Structure property analysis 
Power grids have been widely acknowledged as a typical type of complex 
networks (A. L. Barabasi et al., 1999; T. Xu et al, 2004; V. Rosato et al., 
2007), and many works have applied concepts and measures of complex 
networks to analysing the structural vulnerabilities from a topological 
perspective. According to the models of complex networks, they can be 
topologically classified as small-world, scale-free and random networks. 
Therefore, the first question to analyse power grid is what type of power 
grid is. The first reference comes from Watts and Strogatz (D. J. Watts and 
S. H. Strogatz, 1998) who analysed the graph of the United States western 
power grid. It was deduced that the western power grid seemed to be a 
small-world network. After that, Barabasi and Albert in 1999 (A. L. 
Barabasi and R. Albert, 1999) firstly published that degree distribution of 
a power grid was supposed to be scale-free following a power law 
distribution function, but few of the subsequent later references would 
support this finding. Exponential cumulative degree function was detected 
in Californian power grid (L. A. N. Amaral, 2000) and the whole United 
States grid (R. Albert, 2004). The topological features of the UCTE 
(Union for the Co-ordination of Transport of Electricity) power grid and 
its individual nation grids are analysed and results showed these national 
transmission power grids’ topologies are similar in terms of mean degree 
and degree distribution, which could suggest similar topological 
constraints, mostly associated with technological considerations and 
spatial limitations (M. Rosas-Casals, 2007). Besides, the topologies of the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
North American eastern and western electric grids were analysed to 
estimate their reliability based on the Barabasi–Albert network model. The 
results were compared to the values of power system reliability indices 
previously obtained from some standard power engineering methods, 
which suggested that scale-free network models are applicable to estimate 
aggregate electric grid reliability (D. P. Chassin and C. Posse, 2005).  
 
Structural robustness analysis 
The vulnerability analysis of network is the main motivation for the 
studies involving CN analysis and power grids. The first power grid whose 
robustness was analysed was the North American power grid (R. Albert, et 
al., 2004). The authors removed vertices randomly and in decreasing order 
of their degrees for both generation vertices and transmission vertices, and 
monitored the connectivity loss which measured the decrease of the ability 
of distribution substations to receive power from the generators. The loss 
of generating substations does not significantly alter the overall 
connectivity of the grid owing to a high level of redundancy at the 
generating substations. However, the grid is sensitive to the loss of 
transmission nodes. Even the removal of a single transmission node can 
cause a slight connectivity loss. Especially, the connectivity loss is 
substantially higher when intentionally attacking higher degree or high 
load transmission hubs. They concluded that the transmission highly 
connected hubs guarantee the connectivity of the power grid but 
meanwhile they are also its largest liability in case of power breakdowns. 
The first reference to European power grids was made by Crucitti et al. 
The authors studied and compared the topological properties of the 
Spanish, Italian and French power grids, finding those components whose 
removals seriously affected the structure of these graphs (P. Crucitti, et al., 
2005). Since the proposed improvements also treat power grid as a simple 
graph and no physical features are taken into consideration, we think that 
the power grid vulnerability results obtained with this approach could be 
different from the real situation. . Rosato et al. studied the topological 
properties of high-voltage power grid in Italy (380 kV), France (400 kV) 
and the Spain (400 kV) (V. Rosato et al., 2007). An assessment of the 
vulnerability of the networks has been implemented by analysing the level 
of damage caused by a controlled removal of links. Such topological 
studies could be useful to make vulnerability assessment and to design 
specific action to reduce topological weaknesses. Since the grids are the 
same as used in the former case, most of the results are consistent. 
Robustness of the whole European power grid is studied in ((V. Rosato, et 
al., 2007; R. Solé, et al., 2008), where also includes the resilience against 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
to the failures and attacks of every national power grid. The authors found 
that European power grid composed of the thirty three EU power grids 
could broadly be classified into two separate groups, fragile and robust. 
It is noticed that cascading failures have frequently occurred throughout 
electrical power grids of various countries. The cascading failures firstly 
were analysed in electrical power grid of the western United States (A. 
Motter and Y. Lai, 2002). The degree distribution in this network appeared 
exponential and was thus relatively homogeneous. The distribution of 
loads, however, was more skewed than what displayed by semi-random 
networks with the same distribution of links. This implied, to a certain 
extent, that the power grid may have structures not being captured by 
existing complex network models. As a result, global cascades are 
supposed to be triggered more probably by load-based intentional attacks 
than by random or degree-based removal of vertices. The attack on a 
single vertex with large load may make the largest connected component 
decrease to less than a half of its initial size, though the network is highly 
tolerant. In North American Power Grid, the cascade phenomenon was 
also modelled (R. Kinney, et al., 2005). It was observed that the loss of a 
single substation can lead to a 25% loss of transmission efficiency caused 
by an overload cascade in the network. A systematically study of the 
damage caused by the loss of vertices suggested that 40% of the disrupted 
transmission substations may lead to cascading failures. While the loss of 
a single vertex can exacerbate primary substantial damage, the subsequent 
removals only make the situation worse. Crucitti et.al applied cascading 
failure model into the Italian power grid where they neglected the details 
of the electromagnetic processes and only focused on the topological 
properties of the grid (P. Crucitti et al., 2004). The objective of this study 
was to demonstrate that the structure of an electric power grid may 
provide important information about the vulnerability of the system under 
cascading failures. The power grid has 341 vertices (substations) and 517 
edges (transmission lines). Different kinds of vertices have been 
distinguished. Although the degree distribution is not very different 
through the network, it still exhibits a high heterogeneity in the vertex 
load. Most of the vertices are only responsible for a small load, but a few 
other vertices have to carry an extremely high load. Large scale blackouts 
can be triggered by the failure of vertices with high loads. Perhaps it is due 
to the fact that some highly connected vertices may be not necessarily 
involved in a high number of paths. However, the used model is quite 
simplified for a real electric power grid, so that this result may be not very 
credible since the definition of degree and load here are not very 
meaningful for power grids. Jiang-wei, et al (J. W. Wang and L. L. Rong, 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
2009) proposed a cascading failure model based on degree centrality to 
analyse the Western United States power grid. A counterintuitive result is 
found that the attack on the vertices with the lowest loads is more harmful 
than the attack on the ones with the highest loads. Simonsen et al. (I. 
Simonsen et al., 2008) study cascading failures in power grids using a 
dynamical flow model based on simple conservation and distribution laws. 
Within the framework, it is studied that the role of the transient dynamics 
of the redistribution of loads towards the steady state after the failure of 
network edges. It is found that considering only flow of loads in the steady 
state gives a best case estimate of the robustness; the worst case of 
robustness can be determined by the instantaneous dynamic overload 
failure model. Bakke et al (J. O. H. Bakke et al., 2006) analysed the power 
blackout of Norwegian high-voltage power grid using a model with 
Kirchhoff equations and the same line conductance. The results showed 
that the size distribution of power blackouts in Norwegian power grid 
seems to follow a power law probability distribution. 
 
From static to dynamic 
The works reviewed so far are mainly about the static properties such as 
the categorization of power networks and vulnerability assessment of the 
components (buses and lines) in power systems. Recently published 
papers extend these static analyses to dynamic ones. For example, a 
Kuramoto oscillator model is introduced as a phase model to analog the 
synchronous generator in order to analyze the synchronization stability 
property of the coupled generators in the whole power networks. The 
Kuramoto oscillator is motivated by the behavior of systems of chemical 
and biological oscillators, and it is also adopted as the synchronization 
model in the complex network.  
In Bullo and Dorfler’ papers (F. Dorfle and F. Bullo, 2013; F. Dorfler, M. 
Chertkov and F. Bullo 2013), Kron reduction of graphs was introduced to 
eliminate the load buses of the power network and Kuramoto oscillator 
like model is used to model the synchronous machine, then the whole 
power grid is a coupled Kuramoto oscillator like network. The explicit 
necessary and sufficient condition on the critical coupling strength to 
achieve synchronization is studied. Similar results are also addressed by 
M. Rohden et al. (M. Rohden, A. Sorge, M. Timme, 2012) and S. Lozano 
et al. (S. Lozano, L. Buzna, and A. Diaz-Guilera, 2012). In H. Sakaguchi’s 
paper (H. Sakaguchi and T. Matsuo, 2012), this Kuramoto like model has 
been used to analyze the cascading failure in power grid. In the meantime, 
some other dynamic features are also taken into consideration: a 
dynamical flow model is used by Helibing et al. to study the cascading 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
failure in a power grid (I. Simonsen et al., 2008). Restrepo et al (D. B. 
Larrenmore et al., 2011) proposed instead a general theoretical approach 
to study the effects of network topology on dynamic range. All these 
works extend the complex network theory from steady-state analysis to 
dynamic, which significantly improves the studies about CN theory 
application in power systems. 
 
3. Extended topological measures 
 
3.1 Introduction of extended topological measures 
 
The initial research works on complex networks developed many common 
concepts and measures which are supposed to be applicable to different 
types of networks. When the complex networks methodology is directly 
applied to some fields that neglect of the specific features of these 
networks, analyzing results is unavoidably a deviation from reality. 
Therefore, electrical properties should be taken into account when 
extending the purely topological approach of complex networks.  
Firstly, we consider the equivalent impedance to define the extended 
electrical distance. Assume a unit current is injected at bus i and 
withdrawn at bus j (i.e., Ii=1 and Ij=-1) while no current is injected or 
withdrawn at other buses, then equivalent impedance can be calculated as 
(E. Bompard, R. Napoli and F. Xue, 2009): 
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where zij is the ith, jth element of the impedance matrix. Then, on the one 
hand, in order to maintain the stability and security operation of a power 
grid, each transmission line lij has its own transmission limit ௟ܲ೔ೕ௠௔௫; on the 
other hand, the power transmission between generation buses and load 
buses will involve all lines between two buses. Therefore, to evaluate the 
feature mentioned above quantitatively, we define the power transmission 
capacity ܥ௚ௗ as the power injected at bus g when the first line in all lines 
connecting generation bus g and load bus d reaches its limit (E. Bompard, 
R. Napoli and F. Xue, 2009): 
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where ௟݂೔ೕ௚ௗ	is the power on line lij (lijL) for a unit of power injected at 
generation bus g (gG) and withdrawal at load bus d (dD), and ௟݂೔ೕ௚ௗ can 
be computed as follows: 
d
l
g
l
gd
l ijijij
fff   (3) 
where ௟݂೔ೕ௚ and ௟݂೔ೕௗ 	are respectively the lij –th, row g -th column and the lij -
th, row d -th column of Power Transmission Distribution Factors (PTDF) 
matrix (A. Fradi et al., 2001). 
Based on the previous introduction of new conception combining 
electrical features of power systems and traditional CN measurements, 
three new extended metrics are proposed: 
 
3.2 Entropy degree 
 
Degree, ki, is a basic metric that can measure the criticality of the vertex i 
in the network through their connectivity and a vertex with higher degree 
means that the vertex is more important than others (Newman, M.E.J., 
2010). A good definition of degree should consider all the following 
factors altogether: 1), the strength of connections in terms of weights of 
edges; 2), the number of edges connected with the vertex; 3), and the 
distribution of weights among edges. 
To consider all the three mentioned factors, we resort to the concept of 
entropy to redefine entropic degree of a vertex i (E. Bompard et al., 2009; 
2010):  


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
 
N
j
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j
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w
i wppe
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where pij is the normalized weight of the edge lij connecting vertices i and 
j: 


 N
j
ij
ij
ij
w
w
p
1
 (5) 
where weight wij is defined as the line flow limit on line lij because the 
electrical parameter can reflect the strength that two buses connected. 
For better understanding of our defined entropy degree, figure 1 gives a 
simple example to illustrate the difference between traditional degree 
(both un-weighted and weighted) and entropy degree. 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 Figure 1 Different distribution of weight 
 
In figure 1, the traditional un-weighted degree and weighted degree 
obtained: 
2 BiAi kk ; 
1 BiAi ss . 
The entropy degree obtained:  
3.1Aie ; 14.1Bie . 
It is noticed that, for case A, both edges have the same extent of 
importance for the node. On the other hand, for case B, one edge is more 
important than the other since it takes 90% of the connection. Obviously, 
under a failure of the most important line, case B is more vulnerable than 
case A. Using traditional un-weighted degree and weighted degree, the 
values for both nodes are unique which can’t point out the difference 
existed in the weights distribution among edges. While using entropy 
degree, this difference can be distinguished accurately. 
 
3.3 Electrical betweenness 
 
Betweenness is the number of geodesic paths, connecting whichever pair 
of vertices, passing through a given vertex or edge in a network, which 
can be considered as another measure of the criticality of a vertex or an 
edge through their centrality beside degree (Newman, M.E.J., 2010). Since 
the definition of betweenness neglects the electrical features of power 
system, the electrical betweenness is redefined. Electrical betweenness of 
a line is defined as (E. Bompard, E. Pons and D. Wu, 2012): 
))(),(()( ijneijpeije lBlBMaxlB   (6) 
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The input power of a bus v should be equal to output power of the bus, so 
the extended betweenness of a bus v is the half of sum of power flowing 
through the lines connecting the bus. 

 

V
ij
ij
Ll
gd
l
Gg Dd
d
ge fCvB 2
1)(  (9) 
where L୴ is the set of lines connecting a bus v. 
In the following figure the electrical betweenness is compared with the 
topological betweenness in IEEE 300-bus network, which consists of 409 
lines and 300 buses, including 69 generator buses and 199 load buses. The 
comparison is made by calculating the un-served energy after the network 
is attacked by removing the components (buses or lines). The un-served 
energy is computed by an engineering vulnerability assessment model 
(VSM) (J. Salmeron K. Wood, and R. Baldick, 2004) through optimal 
dispatch and load shedding. 
 
 Figure 2 The average change of un-served load after line attack for 
strategy 1 & 2 
 
Firstly, the electrical betweenness metric is used to rank lines in 
descending order criticality to attack the network. In each evaluation, after 
successive removal of the lines according to the order, the change of un-
served energy is computed by VSM. Similarly, topological betweenness 
metric is also applied to generate the removing order of lines. Figure 2 
shows the average change of un-served load for these two strategies. From 
Figure 2, the amount of un-served load after each line attack according to 
electrical betweenness is more than that depending on topological one. It 
implies that the criticality of lines ranked by electrical betweenness is 
more effective than the topological betweenness. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
3.4 Net-ability 
 
Efficiency is defined as the average of distance between vertices to 
measure the global performance of a network (V.Latora and M.Marchiori, 
2001). In order to analyse the performance of a power grid in 
consideration of their engineering features, the shortest path length 
distance should be replaced with electrical distance while the whole 
performance of a power grid should be averaged by all pairs of generators 
and loads rather than all pairs of nodes since the power is transferred only 
from generators to loads in a power grid. Besides, the power transmission 
capacity can also be considered. Therefore, a new metric named net-ability 
is defined as a global metric to measure the performance of whole network 
(E. Bompard et al., 2009; 2010): 

 

Gg Dd
d
g
d
g
DG Z
C
NN
yA 1)(  (10) 
where NG and ND respectively are the number of generation buses and load 
buses in a power grid; ௚ܼௗ is the equivalent impedance for injection at 
generation bus g and withdraw at load bus d. 
Our proposed extended metrics have been also applied to test systems with 
different scales and configuration (E. Bompard et al., 2009; 2010; 2012). 
Especially in (E. Bompard et al., 2012) a large scale interconnected power 
grid of UCTE with IPS/UPS (IPS/UPS has 713 buses and 943 lines while 
there are 1254 buses and 1944 lines in simplified UCTE power grid) is 
created and used for vulnerability analysis from topological point of view. 
The results demonstrate that the extended approach captures important 
features of power grids that are ignored by purely topological approaches, 
and is more effective at identifying critical components in a network 
which is very useful when performing a security analysis. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this communication, an overview and comparison about the scientific 
studies using CN theory application in power systems, especially 
concerning the vulnerability analysis of power grids, is given. Based on 
that, an extended topological method is proposed in which electrical 
specificity is introduced into CN methodology to analyse and understand 
power systems as a complex system from a topological perspective and to 
analyse the vulnerability of power grids. Three extended metrics: entropy 
degree, electrical betweenness and net-ability, are introduced as new 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
measurements to access the criticality of the composing elements (buses 
and branches) in the network. It is confirmed that extended metrics are 
superior to purely topological metrics in analysing the vulnerability of 
components in power grids from both a global and a local point of view. 
However, there are also still some open questions and some possible 
research paths by means of extended topological thoughts to further 
comprehend the complex system. 
Firstly, as discussed in this paper, power grid is a flow-based network in 
which the physical quantity (electric power) transmission between two 
vertices will involve most lines. However, currently, the linear model is 
considered and DC power flow is calculated to indicate this feature. A 
natural thought is to introduce the AC power flow computation and 
dynamic security assessment into our proposed approach to analyse the 
cascading failure in power grids. 
Secondly, although a large number of researches have been performed to 
the power grids by means of CN methodology, when prompted to 
approach reality, difficulties arise. Because the hypothesis in current 
researches is that structure will influence dynamics and vice versa. But 
how can we demonstrate this hypothesis? Therefore, a linkage between 
topological measures and real dynamic outputs should be analysed and 
constructed. 
Finally, a large scale power grid itself is comprised of various layers in 
terms of various voltage levels such as transmission network and 
distribution network. In our research, power grids are considered as a 
single layer network (i.e., all layers in power grids are considered 
together) while overlook the role each layer played and its interaction. It 
could be possible that each layer has different impacts on structural 
property, static and dynamic robustness of a large scale power grid. 
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